In the 1980's, these developments influenced in a greater extend the relations between majority and minority in Romania. Ceausescu repeatedly claimed that all citizens, irrespective of nationality, are members of socialist nation. RCP claimed to represent the society as a whole, including minorities. On the other hand, the social communist project had as its principal aim the homogenisation, meant to minimise the differences and to create a homogeneous nation as one, expressed in Ceausescu's speeches as "unique working people". "Our society is composed of friendly classes and social categories, which actively participate in the production of material and spiritual assets, they are constantly being brought closer together as regards working conditions, their technical-professional horizon, cultural information and life style". As I will extensively refer to in the last chapter, It would be a mistake to perceive this project as an ethnic one, as well as it would be a mistake to present it as a liberal "citizen nation". I rather agree with K. Verdery who considered the socialist nation as a kind of extended family #23.
This understanding of nation merged with the traditional ethno-cultural Herderian understanding of Romanian nation expressed in the formula "national unitary state". The encounter between this national idea and a monolithic socialism had as a result an even more monolithic nationalism. And this had further effects. Both the socialist rule, which represented the interests of the whole, and nationalism, have totalitarian impulses. Jan Urban said that "Nationalism is a totalitarian ideology" #24;. In this merged "representation of the People-as-One" #25;, there are not social or ethnic distinction; if communist parties constructed their identities by defined themselves from class enemies, the national-communism define enemies at borders, (the anti-Russian and anti-Hungarian overtones of the propaganda) and enemies within (see the dissidents). "Discontent and political dissent, instead of being channelled into the system, as inputs, were successfully deflected by the leadership towards external (Soviet and Hungarian) targets as outputs" #26; Gradually in the 1980's, the Hungarian danger played the first role in the Romanian communist regime's propaganda, surpassing the anti-Soviet rhetoric. In the late 1980' s Nicolae Ceausescu made of the counteract of Hungarian danger the top priority of his domestic and foreign policy. In this campaign, N. Ceausescu insisted on the moral basis of community; it made morality, rather than political interest the basis of political community. This created a dichotomised universe, a black and white perception of the world. If Pacepa's book "Red Horizons" is to be believed, N. Ceausescu had an organic fear of treason. He personally denounced traitors to the fatherland "weak elements or morally decadent persons who, for two gold or silver coins, for a bowl of lentils or goulash, sell their services to foreign circles" #27;. He suspected Hungarians from Romania of non-loyalty and ideological contamination and deviation. He suspected Hungary as sabotaging his regime and working against Romania in the international arena. This conviction was expressed by N. Ceausescu even in his last message to Romanian people: he explained the events from Timisoara as the work of foreign intelligence services, a possible allusion to URSS's as well as to Hungary's interference. And we know that on 20 of December 1989 some military units received the information that Romania is in a state of war with Hungary. Many other scenarios in Romanian press which appeared after 1989 developed further these theories, stressing the invisible Hungarian hand in overthrowing Ceausescu and the Hungarian revanchist intentions.
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To sum up, the Hungarian and Romanian communist regimes offered two different examples of legitimisation and consolidation of power: in Romania, after 1964 the regime legitimated itself by appealing to inside values, re-integrated national symbols and exacerbating traditional nationalism. In Hungary after 1856, the main legitimation claimed by the regime was from outside, from the help and the presence of Soviet troops.
In trying to consolidate their power and to gain popularity, the two leaders choose different solutions: in Romanian case by rapid industrialisation. This meant a high rate of accumulation, investments in heavy industry, a tightened belt for the living standard of the population. In the Hungarian case, the solution was to subsidise the old industry and to sustain the living standard by foreign credits. The consequence was that Hungary moved from "gulag communism" to "goulash communism", in which coercive measures were often replaced by remunerative cointeresation, compromise and negotiations. In Romania, the economic crisis and the personalised regime led to a coercion model of control expressed in a strong and harsh dictatorship.
Nationalism was an official discourse of the Romanian regime, whereas in Hungarian regime it came from the intellectual strata of the society and was gradually integrated by the official discourse in order to maintain control and to gain popularity in society. But, having in mind the differences, we can say that, especially from the mid-1980's, nationalist themes emerged with an explosive force in both societies, putting the Romanian and Hungarian official and public discourses on the way to collision.
Katherine Verdery considered that even N. Ceausescu's overthrow
was made in the name of reasserting Romanian national identity,
which Ceausescu was considered to have betrayed. In her view,
the failure of RCP to control and to subordinate the national
ideology is expressed by the disruption and the destruction of
Marxist ideology (Verdery 1991). And generally, the nationalist
upsurge of 1989 was seen by many scholars as the victory of national
identity against Marxism (Schöpflin 1993; Smith 1991; Hutchinson
1994), "the finest hour of East European nationalism" #28;
(Glenny), the "Springtime of Nations" #29; (Brzezinski).
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