The 1980's have been one of the most complex periods in international relations of this century. It started with the Reagan doctrine (1981) which inaugurated the "hottest" period of the Cold War, continued with the "new thinking policy" of Mikhail Gorbachev and the détente period, to finish with the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War.
All these created a fundamentally different set of external circumstances, that needed a diversification of methods and a serious re-examination of previous tenets. Instead of adapting his policy to these new developments, N. Ceausescu continued the same foreign policy based on a disruptive Romanian role in the Warsaw Pact, Romania's status at the United Nations, and its efforts as a mediator in Sino-American and Sino-Soviet relations, his close ties with the non-aligned countries. But this policy was not effective any more.
The Third World did not prove to be an advantageous political and economic partner any more. China's foreign policy has also gradually changed. Peking improved its relations both with the USSR and with Washington. This made Bucharest role as a mediator useless. And the role of Bucharest as an alley was never over appreciated by Peking, due to the Albanian experience, and to the opinion expressed by the Zhou Enlai that 'distant waters' 'cannot quench local fires' #14;.
If in the former period Ceausescu's foreign policy had been considered as "maverick", Gorbachev's foreign policy adopted many of Romania's long-time foreign policy demands, and so stripped Bucharest of its "maverickness". R. H. Linden demonstrated that many of the original positions adopted by Romania in foreign policy were annulled by new thinking of Gorbachev #15;: Soviet concessions in the question of nuclear weapons in Europe lead to the INF Treaty in 1987; USSR made unilateral troop withdrawal in Europe in 1988; they withdraw from Afghanistan and the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze declared before the Supreme Soviet that the intervention in Afganistan had been illegal; they called for the strengthen the United Nations; and they improved relations with China and with Israeli. In these conditions, the Romanian leader had to over-emphasise the anti-Soviet attitude and originality, with sometimes gratuitous challenges of Soviet policy, which were not so effective any more.
The renouncing to the Breshnev doctrine inaugurated new relations between the communist countries. Gorbachev declared that close ties with Eastern Europe would be his "first commandment" #16;;, recognising the need for change in that relationship. He supported the reforms in the communist countries. Positive signals toward Hungary by Alexander N. Iakovlev in late 1988 and by Gennadii I. Gerasimov in late 1989 indicated that the USSR supported Hungary's experimentation and had no intention of intervening #17;. This led to an ideological conflict between the reformist countries like Poland, Hungary and USSR, and Stalinist ones, like GDR, Romania and Bulgaria.
Another factor that influenced the Romanian foreign policy was the domestic counter performance of the regime: the new costly, irrational projects as the construction of the new Bucharest, the plan of rural systematisation and the decision of repay the foreign debts. These affected the whole perspective in which its foreign policy has been viewed.
The human rights abuse and deprivation practised by the Romanian policy were condemned even by Moscow and, together with other factors, has helped to isolate Romania almost completely from both East and the West
Ceausescu became an embarrassment to the Soviet Union and the
reform-minded leaders of Eastern Europe; Western Europe and the
United States shunned him; and the Third World leaders saw little
advantage in cultivating ties with Romanian. Romania became a
pariah nation as far as the West was concerned, with the Western
capitals condemning one after the other Ceausescu's violation
of human rights
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