At first glance, the Romania-American relations could be characterised as following a "business as usual" course. Ronald Reagan #1; election in 1981 and his strong stance toward the Soviet Union made N. Ceausescu believe that he will have the chance to keep Romanian-American relation at a high level.
The Reagan investiture coincided with the "hottest" period of cold war. Reagan described Soviet Union as an "evil empire", which inspired conspiracy and promoted political terrorism through "wars of liberation" #2;. The president was firmly determined to use all his authority to stem the Soviet tide, and the "Reagan doctrine" promised American support to popular insurgencies against Communist domination #3;. This offered a good ground for the Romanian-American relations. And indeed, in mid-September 1983, vice-president George Bush visited Romania. The reaction was favourable, and he promised continued American support for Bucharest. Bush stated that America's policy was one of "differentiation-that is, we look to what degree countries pursue autonomous foreign policies, independent of Moscow's direction, and to what degree they foster domestic liberalisation - politically, economically, and in their respect for human rights" #4;. He went to specify that the US would "engage in closer political, economic and cultural relations" with Romania, rather than with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria who continued to "flagrantly violate the most fundamental human rights".
But in fact many factors worked together for a gradually cooling of the relations, and for a closer analyst should have been clear that the golden years of Romanian-American relations, were about to come to an end. Romanian-American relations declined sharply during 1983-1985. If in September 1983 Vice President Bush promised continued American support for Bucharest, in December 1985 Secretary of State George Schultz threatened to end MFN if Romania did not significantly improve her human rights practises.
One important factor in altering the Romanian-American relations was the internal evolution of the Romanian regime. Ceausescu did his best in irritating the American authorities. For example, on October 22 the Romanian State Council announced the enactment of an "Education Repayment Decree" effective November 1. It required persons wishing to emigrate from Romania to reimburse the state the costs of secondary and higher education. Article 2 of the decree stipulated that repayment be made in hard currency #5;. These had a very bad external effect and many Congressmen used the decree as a podium issue to publicly denounce Romania's human rights practises. American newspaper coverage of Romania ridiculed the Bucharest regime. The New York Times carried an article on the government's most recent decree requiring official permission for anyone to own or purchase a typewriter. Owners had to submit a sample of the print to the police as a mean to identity the publisher of samzidat literature. Bucharest's decision to bulldoze churches, such as the historic Vacaresti monastery built in 1724 and the Mihai Voda monastery dating from 1591, produced a public outcry among intellectuals throughout the Western world. The American administration became very caution in its relations with Bucharest. In spite of N. Ceausescu's request, Reagan never extended a visit invitation.
Another factor was the decision to
repay the foreign debts, and Ceausescu's fanatical firmness in
it. His efforts to reduce imports and increase exports produced
a significant turn around in the balance between Washington and
Bucharest by the end of 1981. In 1980, USA had a trade surplus
with Romania of about $400 million, but in 1981 it had a trade
deficit of $108 million #6;. To eliminate its trade deficit and repay
its debts, of course that Romania had to prefer selling to buying,
so the American trade surplus was a thing of the past. The decrease
in American exports to Bucharest curtailed business support for
Romanian MFN, a very important support which always counterbalanced
those who opposed Romanian MFN on the grounds of its poor human
right records. As Harrington and Courtney put it "with this
development, human rights became a criterion for MFN renewal" #7;;
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