Hungarian foreign policy in the Communist Era.

Soviet-Hungarian relations and Romania

The relations between Moscow and Budapest were generally in a poor state, Hungarians accusing the same anti-Russian historical resentments as the Romanians: in 1849, tsarist troops contributed to the defeat of Hungarian revolutionary army; and Hungarians and Russians were enemies in both World Wars. The psychological image of the Slavic giant as an imposer of a foreign political system was amplified by the more recent 1956 Russian intervention in Hungary, "the first war among socialist states" #1;. However, although Hungary's and USSR's interests were many times contradictory and incompatible, and with a poor basis for good relations, after the 1956 revolution, the relations between the two countries seemed to enter into another cadre. Soviet Union assisted Hungary for a fast economic recovery with low interest loans, raw materials, especially oil, and technological assistance.

The presence of the Red Army was the ultimate guarantor of Hungary's loyalty to the Soviet Union, and Hungarian leader always enjoyed a good image at Kremlin. Khrushchev had a very good impression on Kádár; which evolved into a most cordial relationship #2;. Kádár's relations with Brezhnev were also good, although not excellent as with Khrushchev #3;. The others Soviet leaders had special ties with Hungary: Andropov was a former ambassador to Budapest. As for Gorbachev, he visited Hungary in the late 1970s and again in 1983 as a secretary of the Central Committee for Agriculture, to return in 1986 as a country leader #4;. He made it clear that he, and Janos Kádár had been good friends for a long time, and that they understood each other very well #5;. During his 1986 visit in Hungary, Gorbachev was received in high honour which remembered the "good old days" of Khrushchev's time.

Kádár had an unfailing loyalty to the Kremlin's foreign policy. He declared "None can call himself a Communist or Internationalist, or even a progressive person who turn against the Soviet Union" #6;;.

These good relations Budapest-Moscow coupled, especially after 1964, with the tense Moscow-Bucharest relations; for Romanians, the relations between USSR and Hungary acquired new significance. In traditional Romanian political culture, the Hungarian and Russian questions are linked. Both countries have territorial disputes with Romania on Transylvania, respectively Bessarabia and Bukovina, and both are considered as the "great historical enemies". More than that, in geopolitical terms, an alliance between Hungary and USSR would have resulted in a veritable encircling of the Romania, as the two countries bordered Romania for a considerable length of its frontiers. As we have seen, after 1956 the Hungarian leadership was politically much closer to Moscow than Bucharest was. And, as we know, in relation with Eastern countries, Moscow always tried to exploit inter-East European conflicts in its benefit, on the basis of the ancient principle of divide et impera. That is why, the Soviet reaction at the Romanian critics was sometimes 'by proxy', "and it is certainly not an accident that the most vociferous critics of Bucharest's attitude to proletarian internationalism have been the Hungarians" #7;;.

Michal Shafir demonstrated that all the major crises in the Romanian-Soviet relations were followed by criticism from Budapest #1;. And any times, at the critics regarding Romanian deviation, Hungarian part added specific criticism concerning the situation of the Magyar national minority in Romania (which must have been at least condoned by both the Hungarian authorities and by Moscow). Along with supporting the Soviet cause, the Hungarians introduced some specific complains about the minority's treatment in Romanian or about the duty of Hungarian government to monitorise their fate. These connections were shrewdly exploited by the Romanian communist propaganda. In the new national trend of writing history, Romanian historiography accused some historical examples of Communist Russian-Hungarian collaboration against Romania (see above Rackoczy plan to join Bela Kun forces, or the role of Romanian communist leaders of Hungarian origin in the RCP). The rumours combined with "reality effect" #9;; made many Romanians to believe that the tensions among the Hungarian minority and even certain factory disturbances are the result of Soviet intrigues #1;. One of the most persistent rumour in the summer of 1968 was that the Hungarian tanks had accidentally strayed over the border and been welcomed with flowers by the Hungarians villagers on the Romanian side of the frontier, and that Hungary's reluctance over the invasion had been overcome only by a promise that the next stage of the operation would be Romania #11;. Anyway, the Romanian concern that the Hungarian national minority could be used as a pretext for an intervention was real, as shown by Ceausescu's visit to areas inhabited by Hungarians, just in the wake of the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia #12;. Other political events demonstrate that Ceausescu feared a Hungarian-Soviet alliance against Romania. R. Linden believed this to be an explanation for the very careful utilisation of Bessarabian question in Ceausescu's anti-Soviet policy. Although "veiled Romanian claims to Bessarabia were periodically raised as a mean of rallying Romanian nationalism or irritating the Soviet Union, the Transylvanian issue is probably the principal reason that Romania has not advanced territorial claims on Moldavia" #13;;, Ceausescu knowing well the danger of opening Pandora's box.