One of the main factor of understanding the Romanian-Hungarian conflict is the analysis of the Romanian and Hungarian foreign policies in the communist period. The two cases offers, as we will see, different examples of "adaptation" to Cold War's external circumstances.
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The Romanian foreign policy under the leadership of N. Ceausescu has been unanimously considered the most spectacular aspect of the communist regime. Respected Western politicians approved and encouraged the anti-Soviet policy of N. Ceausescu, and they applauded Ceausescu's denunciation of the Czechoslovakia invasion. The whole course of Romanian foreign policy seemed to make Ceausescu a special protégé of the West, particularly of the United States.
Consequently, Romanian foreign policy has been subject to many studies (Braham-1964; Braun-1979-1983-1989; Brown-1963-1988; Farlow-1971; Fisher-Galati-1967; Gilberg-1990; Jowitt-1971; King-1974-1979-1980; Linden-1979-1987; Nelson-1994; Staar-1991) and to many controversial or contradictory interpretations. Many scholars emphasised that this policy brought to Romania "a world-wide respect it had seldom enjoyed in its history" #1; and assured for N. Ceausescu "a genuine respect" #2;; on international and domestic arena. In analysing the successes of the Romanian foreign policy in relation with its poor domestic evolution, many scholars went so far as to state that no domestic counter performances could deprive Romanian foreign policy of some of its original initiative, as for example Michael Shafir appreciation: "Romania's role in the Middle East settlement has served rational purposes, and even the most severe critics of the regime would credit Ceausescu with a splendid performance" #3;;. Some observers argued that N. Ceausescu deliberately abjured domestic reforms as a protection against Moscow which, it was maintained, would not have tolerated unortodoxy at home as well as abroad #4;. Although a general analysis of Romanian foreign policy is beyond the scope of this work, a short review will be very useful in evidencing the changing in Romanian foreign policy in the 1980's.
Romania's principal claim to international attention for more than 30 years was its autonomy from the Soviet Union. The "deviation" from Moscow foreign and bloc policies was pursued in strategically steps, from 1958 when Soviet troops left Romania, to 1958-1959 when Romania rejected the Valev plan for a labour division within the CMEA countries, culminating with the famous "Statement of RCP" from 21 April 1964, considered a Romanian nationalist and an essential anti-Soviet document.
The major components of this "strategy of partial alignment" #5;; were: an independent economic policy within CMEA, limited military collaboration within WTO, political autonomy towards Soviet Union. The fulfilment of these political aims was assured by:
- a skilful exploiting of the developing Sino-Soviet conflict, followed by the search for other extra-bloc socialist alliances as China and North Korea;
- the developing of Belgrade-Bucharest defensive axis and of close ties with Third World and non-aligned movements;
- the policy of mediation with considerable successes in: Sino-Soviet dispute in the early 1960's; the Arab-Israeli conflict; the Vietnamese-Cambodian and the Chinese-Vietnamese dispute;
- the developing of close ties with the West, particularly with the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and France.
This tactic was, at least temporary, very fruitful: Romania was the only Warsaw Pact country to have diplomatic relations and close connections with both Israeli and Arab States; the first Communist country to have diplomatic relations with FRG, in spite of Soviet and GDR opposition, anticipating the Realpolitik; many analysts credit Ceausescu's policy of mediation in Middle East with substantial merits in the accomplish of the historical Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel.
Accordingly, Romania enjoyed an increase international status
at the United Nation, in relations with West or with non-aligned
countries. Romania was the first communist country to receive
the visit of an American president (R. Nixon, 1970, followed by
Ford in 1972), and of French President De Gaulle. This foreign
policy gave Romania concrete economic benefits, too. Romania benefited
by special financial aid from Bonn, and was the first communist
country, along with Poland, to enjoy MFN status from USA. It was
also the first communist country member in GATT (1971), in the
International Monetary Fond and World Bank (1972), in the "Group
of 77" in 1976, and benefited by Western credits for development.
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