The status of minorities in Romania; social-economical aspects

During the twentieth century, many relevant changes occurred in the status of minorities in Romania, and this is mainly responsible for the dissatisfaction and resentments accused by the Hungarian minority. The parabola used by Ernest Gellner for describing the situation in Habsburg Empire, that of Ruritania, is particularly relevant for the Transylvanian case. Irina Livezeanu developed further this theory #1;, demonstrating that in 1918, when Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina joined Romania, the political, economical and urban elites were highly of Hungarian, German and Jewish ethnic origin in Transylvania and Bukovina, respectively Jewish and partially Russian in Bessarabia. The new status-quo transformed the Romanians in a politically dominant community, but with a still lower level of socio-economic development, and changed the former socio-economic and politically dominant ethnic groups from Transylvania in "imperial minorities", as R. Pearson named them. In the process of "nationalising the state" pursued by the Romanian political elite, the German, Jewish and Hungarian minorities gradually lost their former privileges and dominant position in the commercial and intellectual life. But this process went relatively slow, and the liberal policy pursued in Romania (see the Liberal Constitution of 1923) was under constant pressure of the nationalist movements, which advocated a more rapid pace of "nationalisation', best expressed in the slogan of "numerus clausus''. It is interesting to notice that the main target of nationalist discourse were German, Jewish and Hungarian "high status" minorities #2;, whereas the nationalists were not concerned with other minorities, more rural and with less political relevance, as Bulgarians, Ruthens, Ukrainians, etc.

The relation between economic development, social mobility and the status of minorities did not lose it importance after the Second World War, and the majority of scholars dealing with Romanian post-war history considered it a key point in understanding the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania (Gilberg; Fischer-Galati; Verdery; Shafir; Ellen Fischer;). As the 1966 data census showed, the Romanians were still the most rural population of the country #3;. The policy of rapid and force industrialisation pursued by the communist regime provoked dramatic changes in social status, and it is clear that rural Romanian population was the first "beneficiary" of this social mobility, whereas the minorities were frustrated by this situation. An accurate scientific analysis of the relation between social status of minorities and the social mobility provoked by economic development is very difficult, if not impossible to achieve, for a variety of reasons. First of all, communist statistics are well-known as unreliable, and the Romanian statistics are generally considered the most unreliable of all. More than that, in the late 1980's, the Romanian authorities simply ceased to provide data for many domains. Another reason is that the figures provided are so inaccurate that we can draw contradictory conclusion based on the same data. And last but not least, the difficulty is deepen by the very complexity of the phenomenon, which hardly can be 'cached' in a theoretical framework, and explained in general conclusions. One relevant example is the level of development of Hungarian communities in Romania. Some of them lived in the most developed areas of the country (Cluj, Mures,) but others lived in backward and non-industrialised counties such as Covasna and Harghita (with 79 and respectively 88% Hungarian majority).

Mary Fischer Galati considered the study of the priority to investment as a possible key to the problem, as "in Romania, because in Yugoslavia, ethnic tensions are heightened by resentments over economic allocations." #4;Briefly, she considered that, with some exceptions, the national minorities "in the late 1960's were concentrated in the more advanced areas of the country" #5;,whereas "the poorest counties are inhabited mostly by Romanians" #6;. In the period 1965-1975 "the Hungarian counties did not appear to be deprived economically" #7;, but had above average growth in gross industrial production and investments per capita sales. In 1968, for example, Ceausescu announced that Covasna and Harghita (see above) would be allocated higher investment for the current five-year plan #8;. By contrast, according to Mary Fischer, in the next period, due especially to the policy of systematisation and equally distribution of industrial production throughout Romania, investments were allocated rather to port facilities along the Danube, or to the traditional industrial regions of Bucharest and the Prahova Valley, and so, "gave cause for justified Hungarian alarm" #9;.

Trond Gilberg used another framework of studying the social mobility: a detailed parallel analysis of the ethnic composition of the country as a whole during the communist regime, the occupational structure of each major ethnic group in 1966 (last data available), and the occupational development in each county over time. Under the same constraints of lack of available reliable data, he concluded, however, that "while this may have been inaccurate in purely statistical terms" Hungarian minority "did perceive discrimination", and this perception, "mistaken or not, must not be overlooked" #10;.

Actually, in contradiction with these views, the very fact of investments and industrialisation was blamed in minority protests, and not the opposite. Increasing social mobility could result in a detachment of traditional communities and changing of ethnic structures of the regions. Both Romanian Hungarians from Transylvania (see the statements of Karoly Kiraly from 1977) and Budapest government complained about investments in area inhabited by Hungarians, arguing that this is responsible for an increase of Romanian emigration in Transylvania and infiltration of Romanians into traditional Hungarian counties. Analysing the same phenomenon, G. Schophlin pointed out that the Romanian state invested "considerable sums of money" in areas which were underdeveloped even when were part of Hungary #11;. He argued that this transformed the "problem of language in factories" in "a genuine one", and even suggested that the ideal solution should be "the creation of islands of employment reserved for Hungarians" #12; We have to admit that these arguments sound very odd for an economist. And the approach centred on ethnicity is not very effective in elucidating the complex aspects raised by a communist strategy of development. Aware of this, G. Schöpflin detailed his arguments in a round-table discussion about Transylvania, pointing out that although ethnicity is the core of the problem, the analysis cannot be reduced to it but "should be understood in the context of communism, which brings with it a whole range of political, economic, technological, and demographic issues that are coloured by ethnicity and that, in turn, colour ethnicity" #13;. However, one relevant example of the inability of this approach to come to grasp with the complexity of the communist regime is the analysis provided for "the systematisation plan" - the announced measure to implement a huge reform of systematisation of half of the Romanian village, in 1988. The plan of systematisation was perceived by Germans and Hungarians as directly meant to destroy the last remnants of their culture in Transylvania, and the ethnic tension in Romania was raised again. The plan also produced a great storm of criticism abroad. Among the scholars, it was also perceived as designed especially for minorities. In my opinion these interpretations:

a) did not consider the phenomenon in a historical perspective, but were under the impression of the hottest phase of the Hungarian-Romanian dispute (1988-1898). Plans of systematisation were implemented in Soviet Union before as well as after the Second World War (see Nikita Khryshchev's agrogorod scheme) and could have possibly been a source of inspiration for the Romanian leader. In Romania, the first measures for systematisation were implemented during the early 1970's. A coherent plan of systematisation of Romania, adopted as a comprehensive programme at the National Conference of the RCP in 1972 was passed as law in 1974 (Sampson, 1976, 1982, Ronnas, 1984). In the early 1980, the high cost led to the discontinuation of the programme; the announced plan of systematisation of village from the late 1980's was the last stage of this policy of complete homogenisation of the "Romanian unique working people".

b) did not take into consideration the complexity of this social project. The theoretical framework provided by the "economy of shortage" model (K. Verdery) allows us to pursue a more complex analysis of the phenomenon. We saw how communists tended to maximise the resources at the disposal of the central apparatus. The implementation of the systematisation plan was at the core of this project: it meant to establish a "scientific" relation between raw materials and production, and a reduction of consumption to minimum (for increasing the centralised resources). It envisaged, among other things, depopulation of some less developed villages and increases housing and population densities in other rural settlements, destined eventually to become future centres of urbanisation #14;. Many laws set up rules concerning the nature and place of the constructions, especially in the countryside. All Romanian cities suffered massive transformation: the construction of the new Bucharest is only one example. In late 1980's, the party announced that retired persons will be moved from cities to countryside, in order to keep pursuing productive activity.

To sum up all these arguments, I share the opinion of Stephan Fisher Galati that we cannot consider the systematisation plan as directed against minorities #15;. The implementation of this irrational and costly project would have result in a great human suffering and dislocation of traditional communities. Many historical edifices would have been destroyed, as it happened in Bucharest with many historical buildings, including protected historical monuments #16;. And it is true that, as minorities are by their conditions more vulnerable, the Hungarian and German communities would have been double hurt by the implementation of the systematisation policy. But, we have to take into account that in Romania there are only 382 localities with a Hungarian majority, whereas the plan announced the systematisation of 7,000 villages. As also Trond Gilberg put it: "The result of such a policy (which was implemented only in Otopeni, a "showpiece" town, near Bucharest) cannot be fully determined ahead of time but a thing is sure: the RCP leadership discriminates against everybody."

In conclusion, we can say that the resentments of Hungarian minority from Romania were amplified by: the reaction at the disruption of modernisation, or better said, at a specific form of modernisation; the reaction at the economic crisis. M.E. Fischer appreciated that as long as the economic situation was good, the minorities were not really concerned with the consequences of social mobility. The Hungarians could also benefit by the industrial economic development, at different social levels. But in the 1980's, when the economic crisis started, more and more complains were heard. An interesting perspective is added by K. Verdery #17; in explaining the effect of economic crisis on the tightening of ethnic boundaries: in the communist "economy of shortage" the more severe the shortage was the more active the competition for survival was likely to be; as a reaction, people tended to draw group frontiers, which increased the chances of obtaining the needs, by eliminating the outside competitors and by using the inside-group personal ties. The tightening of ethnic boundaries in Romania in the 1980's and the use of ethnicity as a basis of resistance and personal connection had the same functional role to play in assuring survival as a secondary economy.

Resentments were amplified by external development, explaining the massive emigration in the 1989. The Romanian program of austerity was compared unfavourable with the Kádár's "consumer paradise", as did the strong dictatorship with the soft Kádár's rule #18;. Hungary acquired an economic attraction for the Hungarian community from Romania (as were in a much greater extend Israel and Germany), as well as for Romanians. Even on the late 1980's, when the economic difficulties revealed the many side-effects of Kádár's consumerism, it still compared favourably with Romania's scarcity and food shortages. The Hungarians from Romania felt disadvantaged. They became "keenly aware of the advantages provided by the present Hungarian regime." #19; The unprecedented emigration from Romania to Hungary in 1989 had not only a political, but an economic motivation as well, and along with ethnic Hungarians was increasingly joined by ethnic Romanians (about five percent of the 20,000 refugee). Two thousand such refugees resided in or near Szeged, some in refugee camps. Local Romanian Hungarians perceived them as economic refugees, and viewed many refugees with distrust, suspecting them as living the country for opportunistic reasons #20;, a tension amplified by the fact that some have been given better houses more quickly than lifelong residents of Hungary #21;.

To sum up, the changes in the number and status of the minorities from Romania had considerable effects on the majority perception. Although the most numerous minority in 1930 were by far the Hungarians, the second and the third largest ones (respectively the Germans and the Jews), exceeded, in number, the first one. So, the political discourse had to deal with national minorities (in plural) in Romania. After the Second World War, the share of minorities in the population of Romania fall from 29% to less than 11%, of which 7.9% represented the Hungarian minority. With the German and Jewish emigration, the discussion about minorities in Romania meant this time mainly the Hungarian minority (now in singular). The political relevance of these minorities also changed. Germans were no longer important political levers of German foreign policy in the area, whereas Hungary increased its concern about Hungarians in Romania.