US Administration, the Hungarian lobby and the Romanian-Hungarian conflict

But the Hungarian lobby in USA played the most important role in destroying the Romanian credibility at White House. Hungarian lobby from USA in the 1980's is a part of the Hungarian-Romanian conflict. It activated the Hungarian and Romanian Diaspora. As Harrington and Courtney said "Hungarian and Romanian immigrants brought their hostilities with them as baggage when they settled in America" #1;. But, as Robert R. King appreciated, unlike the other East European cases, there is not a large ethnic Romanian community in US to lobby for federal support #2;. This conclusion is enforced by the 1980 census data: 315, 238 Americans claimed Romanian ethnic origin, compared with 1,776,902 Americans who claimed Hungarian origin #3;. While Americans of Hungarian origin were very conscious of their cultural and ethnic roots, Americans of Romanian origin lacked a good organisation and were less addicted to their former country. The Romanians from US were in a very delicate situation, as they were against the rule of N. Ceausescu. Organisations of Americans of Romanian origin opposed MFN renewal for Romania, the most important being: the Association of the Former Romanian Political Prisoners, and the National Association of Americans of Romanian Descent in the United States. Hungarian emigration was reinforced by the Hungarian Revolution, which led to the dispersal of approximately two hundred thousand Hungarians throughout the West. Most of them settled in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe and joined the Hungarians communities #4;. They pursued a lobbying activity before the governments of their adopted homeland, and these sustained and vocal critics of minority oppression provided them with an influence beyond their numbers in the West. It is interesting to notice that although Hungarian minority is scattered all over Eastern Europe, from Vojvodina and Zacarpatia to Transylvania, the primarily concern of the Hungarian Diaspora were always the Hungarians from Transylvania. Almost all the complains expressed by them were related with Hungarian minority from Transylvania. There are many explanations for this: they were more numerous, they were considered more threaten, but in fact they have always been considered closer, culturally and historically. Mátyás Szúrös, the leading figure of Hungarian diplomacy in the late 80's, expressed it very clear: "the Hungarians living outside of our borders, but mainly within the Carphatian Basin, constitute a part of the Hungarian nation. They have every right to expect Hungary to feel responsibility for their fate and to speak up for them when they are objects of discrimination". That is why in many speeches, especially in the American Congress, the Hungarian minority meant the Hungarians from Transylvania.

The Hungarians from the United States have many organisations to represent their interests: The Committee for Human Rights in Rumania/The Hungarian Human Rights Foundation with headquarters in New York City, The Commission for the Protection of the Rights of the Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia, operating out of Cleveland, Ohio, the American Transylvanian Association, the Committee of Transylvania, the Co-ordinating Committee of Hungarian Organisations in North America and the National Confederation of America Ethnic Groups, Inc. The most representative and active are: The Hungarian Human Rights Foundation and the American Transylvanian Association. These associations have pursued a very active cultural activity in order to make conscious the American public about the fate of Hungarians minority in Romania. In 1979, the American Transylvania Federation, together with the Committee for Human Rights in Romania, published a book, Witness to Cultural Genocide #5;, a book ill-served by its title. In the mid-1980's, the Transylvania World Federation brought out Genocide in Transylvania: Nation on Death Row #6;. Another tactic chose for influencing the fate of Hungarians from Transylvania was, especially in the 1980's, to put the problem of Hungarians minority on the agenda of State Department and to lobby the White House to change its policy of "differentiation" which gave political and trade privileges to Romania instead of adopting sanctions against it. And since Romania's MNF status had to be renewed every year, they used the hearings of House Subcommittee for Foreign Affairs to lobby against President recommendation to renew Romania's MNF status.

Every year many spokesmen were representing Hungarian organisations: Laszlo Hamos, Tamas A. de Kun of the American Transylvanian Association, Louis Lote of the Committee of Transylvania, Istvan Gereben of the Co-ordinating Committee of Hungarian Organisations in North America and Michael Szaz of the National Confederation of America Ethnic Groups, #7; etc. They argued that Bucharest pursued a conscious policy of discrimination with the purpose of destroying the remnants of Hungarian culture in Romania.

American politicians of Hungarians origins joined their efforts. On March 30, 1986, Representative Ernest Konnyu of California, who was a former Hungarian immigrant, introduced a bill, H.R.1953, suspending Romanian MFN for one year or longer, until Romania provided all people with religious freedom and ended her repression of ethnic Hungarians #8;. Again, in 1987, in the House, Representatives Konnyu and Thomas Lantos of California, along with John Porter of Illinois introduced legislation on April 27, 1987 to suspend Romanian MFN until Bucharest recognised and protected fundamental human rights #9;. In 1986, Laszlo Hamos appreciated the regime's treatment of ethnic Hungarians as "tales of horror", and call for the Congress to no longer indulge the "brutal dictator" #10;. Generally, the arguments of those opposed to extending Romanian MFN in the hearings rested almost exclusively on Bucharest's internal policies toward religious dissidents and ethnic minorities.

R. King appreciated that in the 1980's, the fundamentalist Christians in the United States were very active in domestic American politics, focusing their international agenda on the assurance of religious freedom around the world #11;. Romania became "a prime target of the American fundamentalists" #12;. They stressed Bucharest constant discrimination against Jews, Pentecostals, Baptists and Hungarians. Reverend John Butosi, Bishop of the Calvin Synod Conference of the United Church of Christ in Bridgeport, Connecticut, pointed to Romania's discrimination against Hungarians in Transylvania. Most of the Hungarians were either Catholic or Protestant, and as such Hungarians believers had a four-fold problem in Romania: "The burden of being Hungarian in Romanian state, non-communist in a Communist state, Protestant or Roman Catholic in an Orthodox environment, and Evangelical Christians in a state-controlled church" #13;. This tactic was not always effective. John Crossley, who represented the Christian Rescue Effort for Emancipation of Dissidents, East Watch International and Reference Point, who visited Romania over 30 times in the past ten years, and had monitored Romanian human rights throughout this period, pointed that some spokesmen failed to realise that Romania was an Orthodox country. Listening to some Congressional testimony, one would assume that "Romania is a Baptist country, and that pastors being hung by their wrists is a matter of daily occurrence. It is really just not that way" #14;.

These efforts did not pass unnoticed in American newspaper coverage. Reports that both countries had compiled accounts of each other's atrocities, in the form of histories of Transylvania, appeared in the New York Timers in December 1986. During the same month, the East European Reporter published an interview with Karoly Kiraly a Romanian communist leader of Hungarian origin who spoke about the Human rights abuses of N. Ceausescu and the discrimination suffered by the Hungarians from Transylvania.

The issue of Human rights in Eastern Europe was not new, it had already been subject of numerous hearings before various committees of Congress since the signing of Helsinki Accord on Human Rights in 1975. Generally, the speakers questioned, but did not explicitly oppose, the renew of MFN status to Romania, while they favoured the renewal of Hungary's and China's #15;. But with that new campaign, the human rights issue generated large readership and the status of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania quickly gained international attention, including the interest of a number of American Congressmen. And so, from mid 1980's on, Romania became the central issue in the debate of human rights versus American strategically foreign policy interests. And this revitalised a more general debate on American foreign policy: the doctrine of "differentiation and limited goals" versus the "treat-them alike" doctrine, which became very acute in the mid-1980's #16;.

The doctrine of differentiation was the basis of American-Romanian relation: US had to accept the absence of adequate means to change the status quo of Eastern Europe in the Soviet sphere. The United State had then no option but to define the limits of American objectives: "diversity" and "liberalisation". By offering minor rewards and occasional penalties they sought to encourage the evolution toward semi-independence and semi-authoritarianism of Eastern Europe regimes, for a gradually weakening of USSR influence.

This policy was opposed by conservative American politicians on the one hand, and the public opinion, on the other hand. Charles Gati summarised the arguments of "differentiation policy's" enemies #17;. 1) The Polish case demonstrated that the American hope for a peaceful evolution is unrealistic; 2) US economic presence improves but does not weaken the communist enemies' economic situation; 3) illegal transfer of American technology from Eastern Europe to USSR; 4) the given impression that American foreign policy is conducted by interests rather that by respect for human rights. All these arguments were used against Romania: Juliana Geran Pilon suggested that Ceausescu's independent policy received prior approval from Moscow. Senator Trible said that Romania "maintained the highest proportion of security personnel to population...engaged in active procurement of Western technology for the Soviet Union" and trained and supported the PLO and other terrorist groups. In the 39th General Assembly of the United Nations, Romania voted with the United States only 10.1% of the time less than that of Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria and the USSR.

A great supporter of "treat-them-alike doctrine" was the Ambassador to Romania, David B. Funderburk, who was nominated by President Reagan to replace O. Rudolph Aggrey on 28 of August 1981. D. Fundenburk was a great enemy of Communism (see his book If the Blind Lead the Blind) and he would soon become a great enemy of Romania regime, and so being another significant force in altering American-Romanian relations. He recommended to both R. Reagan and G. Bush that America had to pursue a hard line with Ceausescu #18;, arguing that the Romanian President cared little "for human rights of religious freedom". Significantly, when George Bush visited Romania in mid-September 1983, he spoke briefly with Funderburk but he did not invite the Ambassador to his meeting with Ceausescu. Finally, in 1985, Funderburk resigned from his post, being replaced by Roger Kirk. He was totally frustrated with America's foreign policy toward Romania which he described as "largely mis-conceived and ineffective" #19;. After resigning, he declared to Washington Post that Romania's record on human rights made "a mockery of declared US policy goals" #20;. "We were out foxed by Ceausescu" #21;. He blamed Bucharest for increased Soviet-Romanian contacts, technology transfers to Moscow through American sales to Bucharest, and Romania's growing weapons industry. His reports were ignored by people in Washington, who defended Ceausescu "because their jobs, promotion, careers depend on proving they were right about Romania" #22;. He gave his personal account of what he discovered in Bucharest in his book Pinstripes and Reds. After 1985, the former Ambassador led the opposition to the President's decision" to continue the relations with Bucharest. "Why does it take so long to wake up the US Government to the reality of Romania's tyrannical regime and its threat to US national security interests?" #23; He accused the State Department of naiveté in dealing with Bucharest, and described "Romania's endless disregard for basic human rights" #24;.

The public opinion opposition to differentiation policy was related with the human right performances of the communist regimes. The press gave numerous account of "Romania's repression of her German and Magyar populations". Most stories described the plight of the ethnic Hungarians, whose very culture Bucharest aimed to destroy. Romanian regimes became the symbol of human rights infringement, and the policy of differentiation transformed Ceausescu in "America's most favoured tyrant" #25; Liberals joined conservatives in "a curious coalition" "to oppose Bucharest's MFN status" #26;. And this campaign was also "partly fuelled by Budapest" #27;. Budapest decided to raise the Romania's mistreatment of ethnic Hungarians in international press and international institutions, in a very effective campaign. The lobby of Hungarian Americans coupled with the intense propaganda pursued by Budapest, and turned the Hungarians from Transylvania issue into an international question. The evidence of Bucharest's human right violation strengthened the efforts of Congressmen of Hungarian origin in Washington and convinced many of the American legislators.

But the declining image of Romania in US was not very effective in changing the American policy toward Romania. The main problem was that Ceausescu received MFN only under the condition of Jackson-Vanik amendment which refered strictly to emigration. In 1985, Rep. Lee Hamilton, (Democrat from Indiana) defended the "differentiation" policy in a Wall Street Journal editorial: "Romania's internal stability is precarious and it has adopted many repressive, neo-Stalinist policies, but in accordance with the Jackson-Vanik amendment it has allowed the emigration of 150,000 of its citizens to West Germany, Israel, and the US. since receiving MFN status in 1975."

The law was difficult to change. Committee member Tom Lantos initiate then the questioning of the law meaning, stressing the difference between human rights in 1987, and human rights in 1975. Emigration numbers "is a total misreading of Jackson-Vanik....It is my humble opinion that it is a perversion of Jackson-Vanik if the Department uses emigration figures as an index of how human rights are observed in a country." "Human rights are indivisible ... You will be talking about emigration figures, and we will be talking about human rights in general. That is our concern." #28; These arguments were more and more effective. Consequently, more and more documents issued by the American Administration dealt with the problem of human right in Romania. On March 25, the House Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously supported a "Sense of Congress" resolution condemning Romania's repressive policies toward ethnic Hungarians #29;. In 1983, the US. Senate Committee for Foreign Relations prepared a report entitled Human Rights Issues in United States Relations with Romania and Czechoslovakia, in which the suppression of the underground publication Ellenpontok was deplored. In November 1989, a report was prepared by the US. Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe that reviewed human rights abuses up to November of 1989, entitled Revolt Against Silence: The State of Human Rights in Romania.

The concrete result of this effective lobbying work was the decision of the US House of Representatives, by a vote of 232 to 183 and the US Senate, by a vote of 57 to 36, to suspend Romania's MFN status for six months. The loosing of MFN gave Washington little leverage with which to influence Romanian policy.

N. Ceausescu reacted at all these with "the grace of a bull in a China shop" #30;. He decided to renounce voluntary to MFN status. And since this decreased international pressure on his domestic policy, within a week he launched his plan of "village systematisation", a massive scheme to eliminate half of Romania's 13,000 villages by the year 2000, a new irrational plan which contributed directly to his fall. And with this, America was fully convinced that "if Communism has an evil emperor, he is Nicolae Ceausescu" #31;.

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To sum up, the foreign policies of the two regimes offered two different examples of communist diplomacy. The Romanian leader pursued a Stalinist domestic policy, but he developed a very dynamic and relatively independent foreign policy. The Hungarian leader subordinated almost entirely his foreign policy to Soviet goals, but he obtained concessions for domestic reforms. In the 1980's, the changing in the inter-communist relations allowed Hungary to gradually pursue an autonomous foreign policy. Consequently, its international status increased significantly.

In the same time, Romania's internal developments, coupled with external changes, worked for a dramatic decrease of Romania's international statute transforming it in a pariah of international community.

These had a great influence on the Romanian-Hungarian conflict: as we saw, if Hungary was a veritable 'unofficial leader' of the reformist countries, Romania was the leader of the most conservative communist regimes. These put the diplomacy of the two countries on the way to collision. For Romania, Hungary rather than USSR became the number one enemy, both ideologically and, as we will see in the next chapter, even in terms of internal and external security.