The analysis of Romanian and Hungarian national ideology in the communist system is an important perspective for understanding the conflict which occurred in the 1980's.
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If the Hungarian nationalism had had until the Second World War "deep roots in the class consciousness of the Hungarian nobility and is imbued with the Catholic idea of unity of the lands belonging to the Crown of St. Stephen" #1;, George Barany considered that the total socio-economic transformation of Hungarian society under the communist regime "eliminated that remarkably tenacious and stubborn brand of Hungarian 'feudal' nationalism whose remnants managed to survive the critical years of 1848 and 1918" #2; In this perspective, the Second World War produced a change in the Hungarian official discourse about the national identity. The nationality problem was treated according to Marxist-Leninist theory. The Hungarian communists considered that the problems would be solved "automatically" once Marxism-Leninism had eliminated class exploitation in the country. A. Ludanyi considered that another major shift suffered after 1945 by the Hungarian policy, with the implementation of Marxist-Leninist policies of "proletarian internationalism" was that it was no more territorial oriented as the "bourgeois chauvinism" ideology but minority oriented. #3
The first blow on this new Marxist-Leninist national identity ideology was the revolution of 1956 and its "genuine" nationalism. Old national themes re-emerged, expressed, for example, by the Petöfi Circle's demands for readopting of the Kossúth coat of arms and the restoration of the nation's sovereignty in relation with the Soviet Union; ideas like legal and social justice for all "were the most impressive return to the best thinking of previous generations" (mainly 1848) #4. The 1956 revolution made possibly for Hungarian people to discuss about the fate of Hungarians in the neighbouring states #5. These idea was perceived as nationalism in the neighbouring countries. The fear of revanchism, along with ideological reasons, guided the decisions of the Romania's and Czechoslovakia's leaders to support the Soviet intervention against the revolution. Discussing these perceptions, most of the Hungarian students of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 stressed that chauvinistic, nationalistic or irredentist ideas were not at all characteristic to the Hungarian revolution. But we should be aware of the fact that the anti-revolution propaganda of the Kádár's regime reinforced these perceptions, because it was focused on the Hungarian nationalism aspect of the revolution, and it tended to confirm the worst fears of leaders in the surrounding states. And students of Romanian communist regime dated the changing in the nationality policy of RCP since 1956 (King; Shafir; Fischer-Galati; Ionescu; Ludanyi; Schopfllin), evidently related with the fear of non-loyalty and ideological deviation of Hungarian minority.
The 1956 revolution led the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party, in the following decade, to a re-evaluation of its own nationality policy. Although "the loyalties to the Soviet Union and to the Communist Party were incorporated into the Magyar nation-concept" #6;, the party had to gain internal legitimisation by taking into account and incorporate the public issues, such as the concern about the fate of Hungarian minorities abroad. One of the major sign was the establishment of a showcase for the treatment of minority nationalities, expressed among other things, by the revised educational programs established in 1968. #7 By setting such an example, Kádár's regime attempted to encourage reciprocity for the treatment of Hungarians in the neighbouring states. HSWP tried to gain legitimacy by other means, too, by making economic concessions, encouraging contacts with the free world and avoiding harsh police measures as much as possible. The regime adopted a remunerative rather than a coercive model of control. Kádár's "consumerist" policy was that of subsidising the outdated industrial encompasses and improving the wages of the workers in heavy industry. The loans were also used to cover budget deficits. That is why Hungary enjoyed a relatively relaxed political climate.
But this tolerant climate within the Hungarian society made possible the emergence of a discourse on national identity separated from the official one, promoted especially by populist writers such as: László Németh, Gyula Illyés, Sándor Csoóri, and Péter Veress. Old national ideas as Magyar uniqueness and Magyardom's "manifest destiny" in the Danubian area merged with new concepts, such as the "Hungarian third road", first formulated by the writer Laszlo Nemeth and supported by Imre Kovács, and Gyula Illyés, etc. The Third Road, considered "the most significant Populist contribution to Magyar nationalism" #8;, implied: a) a domestic side: a vision of "Garden Hungary", a Hungary without huge estates, but small and medium-size land holdings and voluntary co-operatives; people should by led by intelligentsia, consisting, however by highly educated peasants; b) an external side: Hungary must resist both German and Russian expansionism. Transylvania had a very special significance in the populist writers thinking: "the idealisation of the Transylvanian State had a peculiar function in Laszlo Nemeth's system of thought: it served as a historical fore-runner to the formation of the third-road conception." #9; Regarding Transylvania, there were contemporary relevant aspects as well: one of the main theme of the Populist writers was the concern and the open discussion of the condition of the Hungarian minorities abroad, especially in Transylvania. For the first time, Gyula Illyés, Hungary's leading poet protested against the oppression of the Transylvanian Magyars in an interview given to a French newspaper during his visit to Paris #10. Other two articles by Illyés were published in a Budapest daily, Magyar Nemzet; although Romania and Czechoslovakia were not mentioned, the references were very obvious. #11 And with this, the fate of the Hungarian minority became a focal point in the work of populist writers and journalists, students and general public. In 1967, Imre Dóbózy, the secretary-general of the Hungarian Writer's Association, declared that Hungarian writers have the responsibility to speak up for the right of minorities in neighbouring states. #12 The Hungarian officials tried, however, to cover and control this new phenomenon. Paul Lendvai pointed out that, in 1978, thirty-thousand copies of a work by Gyula Illies were printed but not distributed #13. More than that, his personal response to a sharp attack in a Romanian newspaper of the president of the Romanian Academy of Sciences, Mihnea Gheorghiu, was not allowed for publishing #14. But this new phenomenon was too strong to be covered, and the officials had to shift from a semi-official acceptance to an institutionalisation of it. The systematic study of the Hungarian minority condition was becoming a major research theme, especially from the mid-1980's. A centre of East Central European societies analogous to the pre-World War II Pál Teleki Institute and based on the Gábor G. Kemény and Endre Arató collections as well as the remnant of the former Teleki holdings was re-established in 1980. #15 If until 1985 it functioned at the Gorky Library in Budapest, after 1985 all this work moved to the country's most important research centre, the Széchenyi Library, expressing its growing political and cultural importance. The Hungarian Studies Centre came under the direction of Gyula Juhász, and researched the Hungarians living in the neighbouring states. #16 This unprecedented work of documentation has had a wide-ranging effect on domestic and international awareness about the minority question in East Central Europe. The institute surveys revealed the fact that only 27 % of graduates were aware about the existence of Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary, and only 39% adults knew what Trianon Peace Treaty stipulated. #17 The publication of the Hungarian Studies Centre and other institutes, including the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, was meant to spread the information and the concern about the Hungarian minorities inside and outside Hungary. The publication of the three volumes Erdély története #18 by the Academy of Science was only one example, although the most famous one, of this work. The strong reaction of N. Ceausescu against it is a proof of its international ramifications. It also demonstrated what deep powerful national forces existed into Hungarian society under the surface of official discourse.
For a variety of reasons, HWSP had to come to grasp to these problems in his discourse. J. Kádár's soft-formula of "minorities as bridges among people" was further developed in the mid-1980's. On 1 December 1984, the HSWP dealt publicly for the first time with the minority issue in its guidelines for the 13th party congress. #19 It was said to be a 'natural demand' that the party should ensure that Hungarians living in neighbouring countries be able to "speak their language, develop their national culture, and contribute to the strengthening of our people's friendship and our countries' co-operation" #20;. The Minority issue was raised by several speakers at the 13th Congress of HSWP #21. At 30 May 1985, The Chairman of the Hungarian Presidential Council, Pal Losonczi emphasised the importance of national minorities' ties "with the mother nation" #22. Due to Mátyás Szúrös, gradually, a new concept of the "double bond" or double responsibility was developed: caring for Hungarian nationalities abroad was "a special task of Hungarian foreign policy" #23;. At 24 November 1985, Béla Köpeczi, the Hungarian Minister of Culture, said in an interview with Austrian TV that the concern for Hungary's minorities was not only a matter of foreign policy. #24 This policy was amplified in the late 1980's. In the last years of the Kádár's era, Hungary faced a broad set of critical economic, social, moral-ethical, and, ultimately, political problems, as failure of Kádár's consumerism put in question the whole communist system Economic situation made the country "ripe for a Peronist-style populism" #25;. On May 22, 1988 Janos Kádár, the leader of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party for more than 31 years, and his closest supporters were removed from office by the top echelon of his own party #26(the reformers successors: Imre Pozsgay, János Berecz, and Károly Grósz #27). A new and rapid program of reforms was envisaged, but its side-effects were that they could have endanger the leading role of the communist party in the Hungarian society. As a reaction Kádár's successor - K. Grósz, moved vigorously towards populism and nationalism. The regime tried to gain the trust of the population through a variety of means other that economic gains, in which it failed, as for example the nationalist card in regard to the tragedy of Hungarians living in Romania. The Hungarian diplomacy had a very safe target: the international discreditation of the regime of N. Ceausescu. But the intensity of the anti-Romanian campaign in Hungary raised the suspicion that the Hungarian party was doing more than just expressing a justifiable concern for the welfare of the Hungarian minority in Romania. The play on nationalism helped the party to gain legitimacy. It was however, a dangerous game, because, along with a tense relation with Bucharest, the regime "runs the risk not only of damaging relations with two other neighbours, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia", "but also of arousing strong historic anti-Russian feelings" or to revive others political complains or initiative such as autonomous political activities. #28 G. Schöpflin pointed out Grósz's difficulties in keeping this process under control, in analysing the different official reactions to two demonstrations held in Budapest in June 1988. #29 The first, on the 16th, marked the 30th anniversary of the execution of Imre Nagy; it was brutally broken up by the police. The second occurred on the 29th and protested the Romanian government's "systematisation" project. The latter enjoyed official neutrality and even encouragement, with the result that between 50,000 and 100,000 people took part, being the largest public demonstration in Hungary since 1956. "The regime was glad to countenance a manifestation of nationalism in conformity with its own perceptions and intentions, but an "uncontrolled" attempt to rehabilitate Nagy threatened the party's ability to set its own political agenda and raised the spectre of the eventual rehabilitation of the 1956 revolution itself." #30;
The growing concern of the Hungarian
society for the Hungarians living abroad and the rebirth of the
Hungarians pride in their national cultural heritage coincided
with the growing bitterness of the Magyars in Romania, on which
I will extensively refer later. And all in all, we can conclude
that if Transylvania had been linked "with many subtle ties
to the rise of modern Magyar nationalism" #31;, it had certainly
a role in the re-emergence of Hungarian national identity under
the communist regime. And the issue of the Magyar minorities developed
in the communist regime may be more deeply linked with a larger
question of Magyar nationalism that is generally assumed, and
the whole Romanian-Hungarian dispute in the 1980's can be a case
in point. In fact, as Paul Zinner states "Revisionism is
as old as the Communist movement" #32;. Stephan Fisher Galati
considered that this is a proof that "the Transylvanian question
remains a major issue in Romanian, Hungarian and, indirectly,
in Soviet policies for reasons rooted in the history, past and
present, of all concerned" #33;.
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