The diplomatic relations between the two countries had reached a dead end and at 9 February 1987, Mátyás Szúrös had to admit that there were basic differences of views between the two countries and it had been impossible so far to reach any suitable understanding #1;. The dispute affected Hungary's and Romania's internal stability, too. The Hungarian authorities approved and supported any action meant to encourage political change and reforms in Bucharest. The first Romanian samizdat, Romania Libera (April 1988), and the samizdat news agency "The Hungarian Press of Transylvania" activated both in Budapest. The Hungarian public opinion also reacted. On June 27, 1988 a demonstration of more than 50,000 people carrying anti-Ceausescu banners and shouting anti-Ceausescu slogans took place in Budapest, in front of the Romanian Embassy. #2; It was the largest unofficial rally in Hungary since the 1956. The Romanian reaction was very prompt: the closing of Hungary's consulate in the Transylvanian city of Cluj, as well as of the Hungarian Cultural Centre in Bucharest, and even the threat of a possible suspension of diplomatic relations with Hungary.
The summit meeting between the Hungarian and Romanian party leaders, Nicolae Ceausescu and Karoly Grósz against the background of the escalation of the dispute over the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania on August 28, 1988 (the first meeting in 11 years after that between N. Ceausescu and Janos Kádár in Debreten and Oradea in 1977) tried to find the terms of an agreement.
According to Miklós Németh and to the Central Committee spokesman László Major, Ceausescu surprised the Hungarian Politburo with an urgent message on August 25 proposing that the two party leaders meet on August 28 in Romania #3;. At a hurriedly convened special session on August 26, which lasted six and a half hours, the Hungarian Politburo decided to accept the proposal despite the lack of time for adequate preparation and drew up a list of ten issues to be raised with Ceausescu, issues based on Hungarian media and recently leadership criticism of the Romanian regime's nationality policy. The HSWP leaders also "decided to keep no secrets" from the Hungarian public; "everybody at the (Politburo) session called for full openness" in reporting on the meeting in Arad #4;.
Although organised in a hurry, the welcome was like a full state occasion, complete with red carpets, military honours, and the two national flags and leaders' portraits put up in the city centre. However, the Hungarian delegation was not given the opportunity to enter into contact with the local ethnic Hungarian population, and no public welcome the delegations. The two parties' delegations included the respective CC Secretaries for international relations, Ion Stoian and Mátyás Szúrös; the Romanian delegation was more high level and included two other CC Secretaries #5;.
The meeting illustrated N. Ceausescu's strategy: unpredictability and surprise, ability to control the discussion and to mask the real problems. The eight hours of talks ended with brief statements by the two leaders at a joint press conference and produced a joint communiqué which made no mention whatever of any nationality issue #6;. Moreover, according to the Hungarian spokesman, the 10 issues on the Hungarian agenda were not emphasised. Although some of them were tangential discussed, the minority issue in general occupied only one-third of the time, although it seemed to be the generator of the meeting. The Romanians part drove the discussions on non-controversial economic topics.
Rural resettlement in Romania was one of the hot topics. Both Grósz and Major indicated that the Hungarian part regarded Romania's program of rural systematisation with alarm as threatening to break up Magyar and other ethnic minorities and to promote forceful assimilation. Before the meeting, senior Hungarian officials from the Politburo strongly condemned the plan, calling it 'evil' and 'criminal' and mobilised international resistance to it #7;. But the stand after the meeting was much more ambiguous, giving the impression that Hungary was retreating from its established position that the resettlement program lacked all legitimacy. On returning from Arad, K Grósz said that:" One of the big questions was where this whole resettlement program stands, how it is developing and how much of it is true in any case. We have heard so many things. From various newspapers we have obtained pieces of information from half-sentence allusions. Various publications have been picked up we wish to know what the truth is." Asked in an television interview if now with this new piece of information the Hungarian diplomats have to change their position, Major answered that:" We asked the Romanian leadership to examine the consequences of the regional development plan for the population, for the minorities, and how its implementation could be suspended... Hungary does not agree with the uprooting of people from their homes. It was not only the Hungarian minority that was brought up in that connection but also with the other minorities - Germans, Serbs- who live in Romania."
At Hungary's request, the Romanian side agreed in principle that a Hungarian delegation of local party and administrative officials would travel to Romania to take a look at the resettlement program, both in areas inhabited by ethnic Hungarians and in other areas. Romanian side also called for a "reciprocal exchange of delegations in order to grasp better what the situation in each of the countries is really like, which seemed as an agreement to follow up negotiations. Anyway, due to Romanian strategy of delaying and masking the problems, on the one hand, and to the radical different opinions on the other, it seemed almost clear that there were little changes that the Hungarian part would really influence the developing of the Romanian systematisation plan.
Another problem was the general consulate. Grósz announced that, at the insistence of the Romanian side, the Hungarian delegation had dropped the issue of the reopening of the Hungarian general Consulate in Cluj, which Romanian had ordered to be closed in June 1988. Hungary reacted at this closing as a violation of the 1977 bilateral agreement on the matter. But, although Hungary considered the consulate as an important link between Hungary and the Hungarian population and intelligentsia from Transylvania, Grósz said that at the Romanian answered that Romania would close down all consulates and general consulates in the country as a matter of principle, "Hungary had to accept this decision of principle and had agreed to take the consulate off the agenda for good" #8;; Grósz also announced that his delegation agreed to take off the agenda for good the issue of the Hungarian centre in Bucharest. As Grósz put it" They have a stance of principle on this as well, namely, that they are not setting up any cultural centre anywhere around the globe, so others should not set cultural centres up on Romanian territory either. This is a stance of principle and it must be acknowledged. We cannot do anything about it. " #9;
One of the problems was that of the refugees. In the first half of the 1988, up to 20,000 Romanian citizens, mostly ethnic Hungarians, have sought refuge in Hungary, and Grósz admitted that Hungary had, thus far, granted more than 7,000 residence permits, from "more than 10,000 requests" #10;. The Romanian part seemed to be ready for small compromises on the issues as family reunifications. The two leaders said at the joint press conference that they had agreed to refrain from encouraging emigration and to permit the emigration of those who seek it. In this "essential issue", Grósz said that Hungary would continue to accept "Hungarian-speaking and not only Hungarian speaking" people to settle in Hungary, and expressed gratitude to Romanian part for a favourable resolution of the family reunification problem #11;.
But there was no progress on the essential issues. The Hungarian side proposed, for example, that a "document committing before international public opinion on this question" be drafted for signature at a Hungarian-Romanian summit meeting to be held in 1989. While Major listed this among the issues on which they had "managed to achieve progress", Grósz made no reference to progress on this but only to the need for a series of meetings that Hungary wanted held to pave the way toward a summit in 1989. They also proposed that the Joint Cultural Commission, Historians Commission, Exchange of Journalists, to be reactivated as soon as possible as they were inactive for so many years. Another problem that "had been dragging on for a long time" was that a delegation of journalists to tour Hungarian inhabited and other areas in Romanian #12;. The Romanian part agreed but insisted that the journalist should be under a supervision of senior party and administrative bodies, while Hungarian part insisted on an independently work. "There is a debate here and there will be one in the future, too" said K. Grósz. N. Ceausescu only consented to exchanges of delegations between the two countries' journalist unions as a mean of ensuring the media "present in a realistic way" and "without misinforming" the situation in the other country, a way of blaming the Hungarian media' coverage of the Romanian situation #13;.
Tourism was also described by Grósz as "a major issue", as the Romanian authorities pursued a veritable harassment of Hungarian tourist in the last period. Grósz and Major reported that it had been agreed to "create more favourable conditions for tourism" to "remote artificial obstacles" to travel, and to examine how to develop organised and individual travel #14;. However, no specific details were mentioned, and N. Ceausescu cautiously state that in tourism, as in all other exchanges, both sides had to keep to "what we regard as attainable in the present circumstances". The only non-disputable point seemed to be the economic co-operation, and the insistence on this field on the joint communiqué was meant to dominate the general impression of bilateral tension and debates. The both sides agreed to look for a growing in bilateral trade and possibilities for joint ventures and cooperations on third market.
Political disagreements were not confined to state-to-state and nationality related questions, but were also confined with ideological disputes as: citizens' rights and each country international conduct. Grósz said that he and N. Ceausescu had trade "reproaches, questions, and pieces of advice". He implied that Ceausescu had complained about the demonstration held outside the Romanian Embassy in Budapest, tolerated by the Hungarian authorities, and about the criticism on Romanian policy in Hungarian media. In turn, Grósz questioned the Romanian leader about the Romanian position at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna, where Romania alone vetoed any movement on human rights. He said that "the Romanian side felt that its standpoint was correct and it was not ready for any concession" #15;.
Another meeting between the leader of HSWP, Rezsó Nyers, and N. Ceausescu that occurred in July 1989, ended without any practical results, proving the failure of bilateral talking #16;.
The failure of the summit radicalised the conflict. Hungarian officials have become more assertive in their attempts to bring to the attention of international forums Romania's failure to meet accepted European standards on human rights in the treatment of its Magyar national minority. The Hungarian minority issue was raised in West, and particularly in the United States where, as we have seen, various bodies have been campaigning energetically on behalf of the Hungarian minority with the object of revoking Romania's MFN status in trade with the United States. Hungarian officials promptly reacted to the systematisation plan, which meant the destroying of about 6000 villages, "an irrevocable loss not only for Romania and the Hungarian nationality but for the whole of mankind" as Karoly Gross said, triggering for very forceful international protest #17;. As living conditions deteriorated, over 12,000 Romanians fled to Hungary in search of refuge. Referring to the problems posed by those refugees from Romania in Hungary and to the repressive Romanian measures, Andre Erdos, the Hungarian delegate at the East-West human right Congress in Paris in July 1989, equated Romanian with South Africa, and described the border barriers as the new Berlin Wall #18;. Due mainly to the Hungarian efforts, the United Nations Human Rights Commission finally responded to numerous complains, and on March 10, 1988 it passed a resolution condemning Romania's human rights practises. Hungary joined the United States, West European and South American states in supporting this resolution, which passed 21 to 7 #19;. The Hungarian reaction at the repression of the demonstrations in Timisoara was very prompt and sharp. On December 21, the Hungarian government indicated that it was abrogating its 1948 friendship treaty with Romania. Although Foreign Minister Gyula Horn rejected the idea of a Warsaw Pact intervention in Romania, Budapest stopped short of a full break in relations with Bucharest.
The euphoria of the victory of the
Romanian revolution manifested in the sphere of the Romanian-Hungarian
relationship, as well. In the National Salvation Front were 14
Hungarians, including personalities such as Tókés
László, Király Károly, Géza
Domokos. The Hungarian press proclaimed a new era of Romanian-Hungarian
relations, having as symbol the heroic figure of László
Tókés. The future events, culminating with the ethnic
violence in Tirgu Mures in March 1990, proved that the solving
of this conflict requires time, sincere and sustained efforts.
In spite of that, the importance of this relation for both countries,
the growing economic co-operation and the present processes of
democratisation and liberalisation recommend a slow but continuous
normalisation of this complex international relationship.
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