The Anatomy of a Historical Conflict: Romanian-Hungarian Diplomatic Conflict in the 1980's

Towards a new stage of the conflict: international confrontations and polemical official discourses

Due to these divergent positions, the Romanian-Hungarian dispute generated many major diplomatic crises. The beginning was the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975. Ironically, both Hungary and Romania were enthusiastic in their support for the document. While Romanians were pleased that the treaty sanctified the territorial status-quo established at the end of the Second World War, Hungarians were pleased by the fact that this document, and particularly Basket III, established a standard for the protection of minorities in Transylvania and elsewhere. From that point on, the Hungarian government become more and more active in international conferences and organisations that focused on minority problems and human rights issues. The pre- Helsinki Hungarian presence at the Ljubliana (June 8-21, 1965), and Ohrid (June 25-July 8, 1974) UN sponsored conference on human rights was rather limited and passive. Since the Helsinki Act, Hungarians have taken an active part in the follow-up conferences: Belgrade (1977), Madrid (1980), Ottawa (1983), Budapest (1985), and Vienna (1987-1988). These conferences were considered by the Hungarian government as stepping-stones in the escalation of Hungarian Transylvanian issue on the international forums. The task of Hungarian diplomacy was to raise the question Romanian regime to international community and to transform the status of Hungarian minority into an international issue in international politics and mass-media around the world.

At 23 March 1983, Hungary raised the issue of national minorities at the Ottawa Human Rights Conference, but without naming Romania #1;. However, at 15-17 October 1985, the issue of the Hungarian minority living in Transylvania was raised directly in the unofficial round of the Budapest CSCE Cultural Forum #2;.

The Budapest Cultural Forum got very little attention in Romania. Radio Bucharest announced on October 15 that the forum had begun #3;. Only two other pieces of information appeared later, both in the RCP's newspaper Scanteia #4;, which stated that the sessions of the forum were continuing, although it had never reported the opening, and that Romania had sent a delegation, but no names were given. Even the composition of the delegation was ambiguous, as it was never announced by the Romanian media. According to Radio Bucharest #5;, the Romanian delegation arrived in Budapest on October 15, headed by the Romanian Ambassador to Hungary, Nicolae Veres, but other sources #6; indicated that the delegation chief was in fact the former Romanian Ambassador to France, Dumitru Aninoiu. The rest of the delegation consisted of: Nicolae Iordache, councillor in the Ministry of External Affairs; Pavel Patona and Ioan Chira, councillors at the embassy in Budapest; and Octavian Olteanu and Gheorghe Albut, both secretaries at the same embassy. The delegation included also Gyozo Hajdú, a member of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, who was the only one associated with cultural affairs #7;. According to the western press, every delegation but the Romanian one included the Minister of Education and the Ministry of Culture.

During the conference, Romania was severely criticised. Several Western participants spoke of the Romanian cultural predicament, especially the destruction of the cultural heritage and the restriction on the freedom of expression. But the main critics were linked with the situation of minorities in Romania. Specific cases of harassment of ethnic Hungarians as well as the general oppression of the Hungarian minority in Romania were presented not only to the official forum but also at the unofficial symposium.

On November 15, the Chairman of the Hungarian Pen Club, Ivan Boldizsar, one of the Kádár's regime prominent men of letters, commented on the Hungarian poet Gyula Illyés, who died in 1983. He said that G. Illies had been concerned about the fate of the Hungarian minority living in Romania. In Boldiszar's opinion, "the majority should grant the minority not only equal rights", but even greater rights in order to compensate for the fact that these people are in minority #8;. A letter from the Hungarian dissident writer Géza Szócs was read out, and Marton Klein, a department head with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claimed that the national majority had to grant "equal and in certain aspects even more rights" to minorities to "counterbalance their minority position" #9;.

In an indirect response to criticism, Radio Bucharest for Romanians abroad said that equal rights were granted to all minorities in Romania. The nationality issues were said to concern only the governmental authorities and the program deplored the fact that "there are futile attempts within some political circles and by some officials institutions to lecture on or even to claim to solve the problem of the national minorities in various countries, European countries included. There is also the habit of brandishing this kind of problems artificially at international forums, both governmental and non governmental" #10;. As a response, at 13 November 1985, when the Cultural Forum was still in progress, at a CC plenum, N. Ceausescu criticised "nationalism, chauvinism, and revanchism wherever it was to be found" and warned that Romania was prepared to take action "even in an international context" #11;.At 25 November 1985, Romania refused to sign the final document of the Budapest CSCE Forum, which had been drawn up by Hungary and Austria. #12;

The Hungarian draft was rejected by Romania as insignificant, and the Romanian delegate, Nicolae Iordache, said that Romania had technical objections to the last paragraph, which recommended that the participant states inform next year's Helsinki review conference in Vienna about the work of the Budapest Forum #13;. Romania presented its refusal to sign the document "as a triumph of Romanian diplomacy" #14;. Western commentators explained Romania's gesture as a clear denial of Hungary's public citation of its minority's grievances in Romania. In the same time, "Ceausescu needs a gesture of nationalism and separatism" to divert his people's attention from everyday life which has become a nightmare" for so many of them #15;.

On 4 November 1986, the major diplomatic confrontation occurred at the third Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) opened in Vienna. It brought together delagates from 35 European and North American countries that signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. Its purpose was to review the implementation of the Helsinki accords over period covering roughly the last 18 months, since the Ottawa human rights conference in May 1985. The discussion of the accords in baskets one (security in Europe) and two (economic, scientific, and technological co-operation as well as environmental matters) were soon overshadowed by discussions related to basket three of the Helsinki Final Act, which deals with human rights issues. Groups of exiles from Eastern Europe, East European dissidents, and various other pressure groups converged on Vienna to protest the human rights record of the Soviet Union and its East European allies. Their petitions and demonstrations outside the conference hall were strongly echoed by the Western delegates within.

There were two preparatory documents: the first, entitled "Violations of the Helsinki Accords", was prepared by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (a non-governmental organisation). The document contained nine reports, each dealing with a specific country in which human rights "violations are of a particularly severe nature": the USSR and its allies, Yugoslavia and Turkey #16;. The second document was the twenty-first Semiannual Report issued by the US Presidential Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, covered the implementation of the three baskets, especially of the third one #17;.

Romania came out very poorly in both these documents. As the first document put it, Romania appeared to be "one of the most closed societies and egregious offenders of human rights in Eastern Europe" #18;. The Romanian regime was said to impose a repressive, totalitarian control on its citizens; to practice an adulatory cult of personality; and to impose "insane financial hardship "on its people " at the expense of their welfare and even their lives" #19;. And both Reports rated Romania among the worst offenders in almost every category of human rights infringement, concerning religion, demographic policy, minorities' rights, labour union, exit permits and family reunifications #20;.

Minorities rights were mentioned several times by Western delegates. According to the US semiannual report, "evidence continues to suggest that despite public pronouncements to the contrary, the Romanian government systematically seeks to integrate and absorb these minorities into one Romanian culture" #21;. At 22 November a British delegate raised directly the issue of the Magyar minority in Transylvania, provoking the reaction of Romanian delegation head, Ion Diaconu #22;, who accused Britain of setting itself up as a spokesman for a group of agitators, adding that the days of the Austrian empire were over. Dumitru Aninoiu, another Romanian delegate, stated that the Vienna meeting should refrain from "any interference in the internal affairs of other states" #23;. Endre Erdos, Hungary's delegation leader at the conference, criticised the treatment of the Magyar minorities in neighbouring countries, comparing it unfavourably with Hungary's nationality policy #24;.

The Romanian delegates concentrated their speeches almost exclusively on the broader themes related mainly to basket one and two of the Helsinki accords with little mentions to basket three. They declared that Romania had been unfair criticised about its human rights record. Dumitru Aninoiu, a Romanian diplomat holding ambassadorial rank and the head of the Romania's delegation, presented a set of proposals, many of them clearly impractical and propagandistic. They included a set of disarmament measures and new international forums to be set up under the aegis of the CSCE; the creation of two new European bodies, one for nuclear disarmament and other for economic, technological and scientific co-operation; and an end to any form of discussions about the minority problems #25;. Aninoiu's mention of Human Rights was in line with Ceausescu's speech at his birthday celebration on January 26, 1987 #26;. Ceausescu criticised those "who ventures to question circumstances dating back thousand of years and the situation established after World War II... in order to sow discord among people." #27; These practices, Ceausescu added "represent a nefarious interference in other states' domestic affairs" and "are in flagrant contravention of the Helsinki spirit and the ideas that underlay the process of building European security". Accordingly, the Romanian delegation in Vienna was instructed to reject any "reactionary, diversionary attempts" to mention human rights and minority problems. Any intervention in this matter was aimed at creating, according to Romanian media, "false and imaginary problems, meant only to distract public attention from the real problems preoccupying the minds of Europeans, such as disarmament, security, co-operation, and the granting and implementation of the fundamental rights to work, education, a peaceful life, a free and dignified existence" #28;. Efforts to ensure the rights of minorities were said to come from "nationalistic and chauvinistic circles wanting to question the historical reality that resulted from World War II that is, the present state borders, and run counter to the Helsinki Final Act." #29; Aninoiu said that every country solved the nationality problem within the framework of its overall policy. "The nationality problem in each country is being solved in the context of its general economic and social development", just "like any other domestic problem" and "it is a matter of national sovereignty and belongs exclusively to the competence of the respective state" #30;. As a result, Romania refused to sign the final documents of the conference.


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